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Abstract :  During the interwar 
period, the Royal Canadian Air Force 
reoriented itself from an exclusively 
civil to a military service. In doing so, 
it assumed primary responsibility for 
Canada’s direct home defence, put in 
place a command and administrative 
air defence structure spanning 
Canada, and gained coequal status 
with the other services. Moreover, 
by 1939 the air force had on hand 
a cadre of technically trained staff 
officers prepared to take over the 
many higher appointments created 
by the expansion required to meet the 
demands of the Second World War.
For the first decade of its existence, the Royal Canadian Air Force was 
all but excluded from the military 
planning process in Canada. Despite 
its superb antecedents in the First 
World War – more than 20,000 
Canadians served in the Royal Flying 
Corps and the Royal Air Force – the 
air force barely survived postwar 
reconstruction. When the fledgling 
two-squadron Canadian Air Force, 
which finally had been formed in 
late 1918, was disbanded in Britain 
in 1919, the future of Canadian 
military aviation was left very much 
in doubt. By 1920, a non-permanent 
air force had been organized, and 
two years later it attained separate 
permanent status in a reconfigured 
Department of National Defence. 
There was no doubt, however, of the 
RCAF’s subordination to the army. 
As a minor cog in Canada’s militia 
establishment, its senior officer was a 
Group Captain whose military advice 
was confined to technical matters and 
then only on the rare occasions on 
which it was asked.1 National defence 
planning was a matter for the army 
and to a much lesser extent the navy. 
The Air Force’s theoretical role was 
to provide support, like any other 
fighting arm, on the First War model.
The RCAF found its raison 
d’etre in civil aviation rather than in 
military flying (the case for which had 
a certain incongruity in the Canadian 
twenties), when it was made the 
central government agency not only 
to regulate and control the airspace 
but to conduct civil flying operations 
for the federal government. Initially 
these centered on forest fire patrols 
which gave way by the end of the 
decade to an ambitious national 
program of aerial survey. The range of 
the service’s civil activities, however, 
was remarkable – from conducting 
buffalo and reindeer census to paying 
Indian Treaty money, from crop 
dusting to topographical mapping, 
from medical rescue missions to 
pioneering exploratory flights. 
Military training as such was rare. 
A few elementary inter-service 
exercises were held, and the Camp 
Borden training center ran regular 
refresher and technical courses in 
the off season, but military aviation 
rated a low priority. It was not until 
1927 that the “bush pilots in uniform” 
obtained their first military aircraft 
since the war, a flight each of already 
obsolescent RAF Atlas’ and Siskins.
A l t h o u g h  i t  w a s  f u l l y 
preoccupied with civi l  f lying 
operations, the RCAF never entirely 
disregarded the military component 
in its make-up. All but a few newly 
commissioned RCAF officers had 
served with the RFC/RAF/RNAS 
during the past war, many with 
combat distinction. Furthermore, 
the RCAF was organized, trained, 
and administered on the RAF model 
and shared most of its customs and 
traditions, from uniform patterns 
to mess dinners. Even in the bush, 
the eternal military verities had to 
be observed, officers saluted and 
trousers pressed. More important, 
as early as 1922 the RCAF regularly 
sent selected officers to Britain for 
training in RAF establishments, 
especially the Imperial Defence 
and RAF Staff Colleges. In time, a 
growing body of officers was exposed 
to ideas and doctrine in the tactical 
and strategic employment of aircraft. 
“Schools for higher training are a 
necessity if the flying officer is to 
become something more than a mere 
chauffeur,” declared Lord Trenchard, 
the directing force of the RAF, and 
he had insisted on forming separate 
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Air Force schools because to rely on 
those of the older services “would 
make the creation of an Air Spirit 
an impossibility.”2 The RAF Staff 
College course of study, to inculcate 
that air spirit, was
devised with two objects in view; 
firstly to train officers in staff duties 
whether in peace or war; secondly, 
to afford a general education which 
will serve as a sound foundation for 
the building up of a school of thought 
in the Royal Air Force. It aims at 
developing the habit of steady 
reading and thinking rather than at 
the acquisition of a mass of detail.3
The teaching i tself ,  which 
concentrated on imperial and small 
wars (until 1939 the major war game 
was based on mounting a counter 
to a Turkish threat to Mosul),4 had 
little direct relevance to RCAF needs 
but, as one RAF graduate later 
commented, “The value was not in 
the stuff but in the training I had in 
absorbing it and dealing with it.”5
RCAF students customarily were 
called upon to lecture on their 
unique work in Canada and they 
duly described what must have 
seemed to their RAF peers, back 
home from policing imperial deserts, 
a somewhat esoteric life surveying 
the Canadian back woods. They also 
were exposed to what was rapidly 
becoming conventional air force 
wisdom, the Trenchardian doctrine 
of employing bombers independently 
as the prime air offensive weapon 
to subdue the will and production 
centres of the enemy. On his return to 
Canada, a 1924 RCAF graduate, Wing 
Commander J.L. Gordon, wrote, in 
terms which Trenchard would have 
approved: 
It would appear…that in stressing 
the necessity for establishing Air 
Superiority prior to carrying out 
aerial operations which may be of 
vital importance to both an Army 
and a Navy, the work of these two 
services must suffer considerably in 
the opening phases of any campaign. 
There would appear to be only one 
practicable means of establishing this 
very much desired condition, and 
that is offensive operations against 
the enemy’s means of production… 
It should be realized…that offensive 
operations in the air, as distinct from 
purely cooperative measures, should 
concentrate on what must eventually 
be their main object. This, it seems, 
is the principal centre of the enemy.6
L a t e r  C a n a d i a n  s t u d e n t s 
also easily absorbed the dogma 
of bombing. As Squadron Leader 
G.E. Wait wrote following his Staff 
College tour, “The moment war is 
declared, Air Power must be ready 
to exert direct pressure upon the 
enemy’s internal organization.” 
Centers vital to the enemy’s war-
making capacity would be the prime 
bombing targets but “to safeguard 
her home interests,” the possibility 
could not be ruled out that Britain 
might “be forced into direct air 
attack on enemy populations.” In 
any event, “civilian casualties will be 
unavoidable,” but, “C’est la guerre.” 
Offensive bomber forces possessed 
unprecedented flexibility:
We strike first, then, at another and 
equally vital point, within range 
of both our bombers and fighters. 
Well directed bombing will cause a 
clamour for protection. The tendency 
will be for the enemy to divert some, 
maybe all, of his fighters to defend 
the threatened point.
But  the  result  wi l l  not  be  a 
proportional increase in resistance to 
our attacks. We have the advantage 
of initiative, choice of objectives, 
approaches, methods, and times of 
attack. Also, being forced on to the 
defensive will react adversely on the 
morale of the defenders…7
On his return from the 1930 Staff 
College course Flight Lieutenant 
G.R. Howsam published “Canada’s 
Problem of Air Defence,” which 
brought bombing theories home 
to Canadian realities.8 Howsam 
accepted the basic premises of air 
power proponents that while aviation 
resources employed with the navy 
and army were subordinate to them, 
Year
Appropriations Flying Hours Strength (Permanent)
Military Civil Service Civil Officers Airmen
1930 2,510,000 4,965,700 13,996 13,640 175 669
1931 2,266,000 3,066,000 19,172 11,185 177 729
1932 1,560,000 190,000 6,904 3,522 178 700
1933 1,405,000 292,000 7,272 3,491 103 591
1934 1,930,000 332,000 8,721 3,746 106 586
1935 3,130,000 1,176,364 12,010 4,050 118 676
1936 4,685,028 2,124,187 12,241 4,686 142 884
1937 11,391,650 361,000 17,417 2,361 148 959
1938 11,330,517 365,000 24,204 2,864 178 1,523
1939 28,450,515 325,050 261 1,930
1944 1,260,168,000 38,756 140,626
1945 526,320,500 8,818 44,425
1947 89,587,140 2,140 10,486
The RCAF Siskin Aerobatic Flight Team. 
This aircraft was the only first-line 
fighter the air force had until the late 
1930s.
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true air power was only achieved 
through the independent use of 
the air arm. “Bombers, supported 
by fighters,” he wrote, “are the 
embodiment of air power which is 
applied by air bombardment.” While 
fighters provided the means for 
defence, which could be only partial 
at best, bombers were the prime 
weapon:
In the last resort air power is one 
of the instruments whereby a 
nation is guarded, but without air 
bombardment an air force becomes 
an ancillary to the other services. 
Abolish air bombardment and there 
is no air power, no air striking force, 
no air defence and no Air Menace.9
Canada’s military responsibility, 
Howsam thought, had been clearly 
def ined at  the  1926 Imperia l 
Conference which accepted the 
principle that each component of the 
Empire must provide, first of all, for its 
own defence. Canada had remained 
invulnerable from the possibility of 
air attack until then, but technological 
advance would make coastal raids 
from carrier aircraft feasible within 
a short ten years. Fighters could 
offer some defence, but the principal 
means lay in using bombers to 
attack the bases without which 
enemy aircraft were useless. Heavy 
bombers with a 450-mile operational 
radius meant that allowing for ships’ 
night movement during which they 
would be undetected, “no carrier 
or other surface craft can approach 
unmolested within 150-miles of our 
shores if protection aircraft (bombers) 
are employed.” An attack on Canada’s 
Pacific coast was most likely and 
to defend it “our requirements in 
military aircraft are bombers, fighters 
and flying-boats for the Air Force 
proper. These are subject to air 
strategy and would be employed 
chiefly in Coast Defence.” Howsam 
proposed to circumvent the high 
costs of permanent units by forming 
auxiliary squadrons with permanent 
cadres initially on the scale of one 
flying-boat and one bomber squadron 
for each coast. “In the 20th Century 
there may be a Seven Days War – 
an air war.” Howsam concluded, 
“the nation which can most quickly 
beat its plough shares into swords 
(bombers on the enemy) will win 
the next war. The suggested peace 
plan of Non-Permanent Squadrons 
of Air Force is considered a step in 
this direction.”10
It would be misleading to place 
too much emphasis on these views. 
Junior officers in any age publish 
their own uncertain thoughts in 
military journals, particularly after 
the out-of-the ordinary intellectual 
stimulation of a staff course. Howsam 
tactfully made clear that he had 
“no intention of tilting at Air Staff 
opinion,”11 which, as late as 1933, 
even after drastic financial reductions 
had eliminated most flying, still 
viewed civil operations as the RCAF’s 
primary training mechanism,
as it is considered that the experience 
within limits is equally as valuable 
as an equivalent amount of flying 
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Two Vickers Vedettes of No.5 Photo Detachment moored to a dock at Long Lake, Manitoba. Civil flying 
operations in the Canadian north earned RCAF flyers the title of “bush pilots in uniform” during the 1920s.
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performed for strictly military 
training, and in addition, there is 
nothing better for the morale of 
the force than a certain amount of 
work of practical importance to the 
development of the country.12
Nor did the articulation of an air 
doctrine indicate any alteration 
in the Canadian defence planning 
structure. Planning remained the 
preserve of successive Army Chiefs 
of the General Staff who, as far as 
the record shows, felt little need 
to consult their air force advisors 
on policy matters, at least until the 
mid-1930s. The process of thinking 
about aerial options, therefore, was 
important primarily in allowing 
officers to evolve a modicum of 
service identity – Trenchard’s “Air 
Spirit” – which eventually might 
be called upon. Howsam recalled 
many years later, “We had no Staff 
College in Canada at all. That level 
of thinking, that level of doing, 
was completely unknown. It was a 
Godsend. Without it, we’d have been 
absolute neophytes.”13
* * * * *
It is impossible to say how long the existing civil-military relationship 
would have continued without an 
external stimulus for change. But 
coincidentally in the early 1930s two 
unrelated but equally incongruous 
circumstances combined to jolt 
the RCAF out of its civil and into 
a purely military role. The first 
was the Great Depression which 
prompted the  government  to 
decimate the aviation budget, thereby 
setting in motion a chain of events 
which led by 1936 to a structural 
separation of civil from military 
aviation. The second was the military 
staff planning made necessary by 
Canada’s participation in the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference, which, by 
requiring Canadian military planners 
to reconsider their force levels, also 
prompted them to reevaluate the 
country’s strategic priorities and the 
employment of the three services.14
It was fitting that disarmament 
talks concerned with the utility and 
ethics of bombing got under way 
as Japanese bombs were falling on 
Chinese cities.15 For Canada’s new 
chief of the general staff (CGS), 
RCAF Aircraft Strength
1936 1939
Service
31
Service
92
Siskin 8 Hurricane 19
Atlas 15 Siskin 5
Shark 4 Atlas 13
Vancouver 4
Wapiti 22
Battle 10
Civil 58
Shark 11
Vancouver 4
Training 46 Stranraer 8
Overall Total 135 Photographic and Communications 48
Training 130
Overall Total 270
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Two aircraft at RCAF Station Jericho Beach, Vancouver, BC. On the left is a Vickers Vedette and on the right a float version of the 
dependable De Havilland Moth trainer.
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however, the timing was fortuitous 
for other reasons. Since becoming 
chief in 1928, Major-General A.G.L. 
McNaughton had become convinced 
of the need for a fundamental review 
of Canadian defence planning and 
the Geneva discussions provided a 
convenient reason for proceeding. 
Until 1930, the only completed 
contingency plan for the employment 
of Canadian troops was designed to 
defend the country against American 
attack (Defence Scheme No.1). This 
envisaged mobilizing a 15-division 
militia in a levee en masse to take the 
field and hold until relief could be 
ensured by the Royal Navy. The mass 
militia force on which it depended, 
however, never materialized in the 
inter-war years as funds were not 
made available to recruit and equip 
it. Its only value was to provide a 
“worst case” scenario which gave a 
rationale for organization, training, 
and mobilization, which could be 
adapted to other purposes.16 For its 
part, the RCAF was not consulted 
until 1927 when, at the request of the 
Joint Staff Committee, the Director 
allotted (paper) army cooperation 
squadrons on the First War scale 
of one to each (paper) division and 
corps headquarters.
Defence Scheme No.1 had only 
a tenuous connection with political 
reality and it seems doubtful that it 
ever would have been considered 
at all had staff planners been given 
clear political direction. This was not 
forthcoming and “one searches the 
records of successive administrations 
in vain for evidence of anything 
that could be described as a well-
considered and consistent military 
policy,” Professor Stacey has written:
no responsible Canadian statesman 
ever paused to ask himself these 
simple and fundamental questions: 
if this peace proves fleeting, what 
is the nature of the menaces that 
will threaten Canada? What form of 
organization would offer the greatest 
security against them? How far does 
the existing organization satisfy these 
needs?17
In the absence of a planning 
mandate,  McNaughton’s  staff 
raised many of these questions in 
an appreciation of the country’s 
defence requirements it completed 
in January 1931. In the process it 
demolished the case for an American 
war. Noting that the evolution of 
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An Armstrong Whitworth Siskin at Rockcliffe Air Station. Standing in front of the aircraft are (left to right): Flying Officer E.A. McNab, 
Flight Lieutenant Victor Beamish, and Flying Officer E.A. McGowan. The three officers were members of the famed Siskin flight, which 
thrilled thousands of spectators at air shows in Canada and the United States. McNab would later command No.1 Fighter Squadron 
RCAF during the Battle of Britain and rise to the rank of group captain. Beamish, an RAF officer seconded to the RCAF, reached the 
same rank before being killed in action in March 1942. 
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events over the previous ten years 
had invalidated the premises on 
which Defence Scheme No.1 had 
been based, the staff concluded that 
the possibility of a continental war 
had receded beyond the bounds of 
realistic probability. Ties between 
Canada and the United States had 
grown so close, and international 
conventions so inhibiting, that:
Provided Canada acts ethically 
and on the defensive, the United 
States must spurn the Treaty of 1909 
(which created the International 
Joint Commission), defy the League 
of Nations and forget the Pact of 
Paris (Kellogg-Briand) in resorting 
to invasion each and all impossible 
to conceive under existing world 
conditions.18
Certainly, from Canada’s perspective, 
if an appeal to arms to settle North 
American differences had made any 
sense at all in 1919, it no longer did 
so in the 1930s.
The direct defence of Canada against 
invasion by the United States is 
a problem which in the last ten 
years has become increasingly 
susceptible to political solution, but 
quite incapable of being satisfactorily 
answered by Empire military 
action…[therefore] organization of 
the Militia Forces of Canada for a war 
of this nature is undesirable, even if 
it were practicable.19
Having rejected the concept of 
a North American land war there 
was no need to maintain the existing 
unwieldy militia structure, and 
McNaughton recommended that it 
be reduced to a more manageable 
seven-division level. The government 
accepted the proposal, despite 
considerable objections from militia 
units which would be disbanded 
or amalgamated, and was able to 
offer it as tangible evidence of its 
support for disarmament. As Sir 
Maurice Hankey, the secretary to 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
noted, “By this step the Government 
could take the credit for a large 
reduction in establishments, and the 
army would be the more efficient for 
the reduction.”20
For the RCAF, the Geneva 
discuss ions  ra ised two qui te 
different immediate concerns. One 
was the possible freeze of current 
establishments which would then be 
accepted as upper force limits; this, 
of course, would have set the RCAF’s 
military potential permanently at 
zero. The other was the proposal to 
restrict the habit of seconding military 
aviators for civil duties. Although this 
was meant to control the practice, 
Ca
na
di
an
 W
ar
 M
us
eu
m
  1
99
10
10
9-
19
9
The Armstrong Whitworth Atlas was a purpose-built army co-operation aircraft based on First World War experience. Here an Atlas 
skims low over an airfield to practice a message snatch.  Note the observer leaning over the side of the aircraft.
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especially by Germany, of masking 
the build-up of military capabilities 
behind a guise of civil flying, its 
effect on the RCAF would have been 
equally crippling. However, nothing 
came of either possibility as the 
Geneva talks ground to a halt amidst 
the wrangling which accompanied 
the breakdown of international 
order.21
The  s ign i f i cant  aspec t  o f 
the disarmament events on the 
development of the RCAF, however, 
lay primarily in the strategic 
reassessment they had set in motion. 
As long as the direct defence of the 
country remained based on a mass 
land army, the air force was relegated 
to a subordinate, support role, 
much as it had been on the Western 
Front. When the oversize militia 
was restructured, however, the air 
force’s role in Canada’s defence 
posture also was altered. The general 
staff identified two contingencies, 
neither of them new but now given 
enhanced priority, for which plans 
were required. One was participation 
“in another overseas war in defence 
of Empire security.”22 The possibility 
of raising an expeditionary force for 
imperial deployment – or the indirect 
defence’ of Canada as it invariably 
was termed – never had been far from 
the minds of militia commanders 
and staffs. Nor did it stray far now. 
The option was so well entrenched 
in a political no-man’s-land that it 
could be approached only warily; 
but planning proceeded in any 
case, the RCAF’s role being limited 
to supplying army cooperation 
squadrons in support of ground 
forces. The other option, in effect, 
redefined the concept of “direct 
defence.” The staff concluded that 
any military threat to Canada likely 
would materialize on the coasts as 
a by-product of a war between the 
United States and another power, 
most probably Japan. Even if it was 
able to avoid belligerency, Canada 
would be forced to defend its coastal 
borders as “the only alternative to 
active participation on one side or 
the other.” Otherwise, “if Canada 
does not take the requisite measures 
to maintain her neutrality…the 
United States would doubtless take 
independent action, presumably on 
Canada’s behalf.”23
Traditionally, of course, the 
senior service had responsibility 
for coastal defence, but the RCN’s 
emaciated 1,000-sailor complement 
was barely able to man the four 
destroyers and few other smaller 
vessels it could put to sea. To be made 
effective, the navy needed either 
a major ship acquisition program 
or to be assured of immediate 
reinforcement on the outbreak of war; 
the former was politically impossible, 
the latter technically unlikely. In the 
CGS’ view, “the Canadian navy as 
presently constituted is not an answer 
to any problem of Canadian defence.” 
McNaughton may have shared a 
general landlubbers’ aversion to 
salt water but he was also a realistic 
pragmatist24 who was attempting to 
fashion a coherent defence policy 
within the paralyzing constraints 
imposed by depression funding. 
He also dominated the defence 
establishment, both by the force of his 
intellect and personality and his close 
association with the Prime Minister 
which gave him considerable political 
influence. He was convinced that the 
limited defence funds could be used 
best in maintaining small, technically 
impeccable, permanent cadres which 
could quickly train larger forces 
on mobilization. Coastal defence 
required forces in being, but the RCN 
was unable to present “a minimum 
deterrent to seaborne attack…
Moreover it is of the nature of naval 
forces that they cannot be rapidly 
expanded to meet emergencies 
and, in consequence, it seems to 
me that little purpose is served in 
maintaining a small nucleus.”25 The 
air force, McNaughton concluded, 
could replace the navy; aerial patrols 
not only would be more effective 
but were much less expensive; and 
the RCAF could well assume the 
responsibility as the country’s first 
line of home defence: 
Air Forces even in small numbers are 
a definite deterrent in narrow waters 
and on the high seas in the vicinity 
of the shore; they can be developed 
with considerable rapidity provided 
a nucleus of skilled personnel in a 
suitable training organization is in 
existence; pilots engaged in civil 
aviation can be quickly adapted to 
defence purposes; civil aircraft are 
not without value in defence, and 
any aircraft manufacturing facilities 
are equally available to meet military 
as well as civil requirements. That is, 
from a comparatively small current 
expenditure a considerable deterrent 
can be created in a relatively short 
time, and this is particularly the case 
in Canada where aviation plays a 
large part in the economic life of the 
country, a part which is increasing 
naturally at a rapid rate.26
* * * * *
By the end of 1931 the RCAF staff had completed a preliminary 
review of the units it would need 
to meet its newly identified military 
responsibilities.27 Then, when Group 
Captain Gordon returned from 
his course at the Imperial Defence 
College in the spring of the new year, 
he was relieved of his administrative 
duties specifically to prepare the 
more detailed plans the air force 
required.28 In mid-July, Gordon’s staff 
submitted a proposal for the “Peace 
Organization and Establishments 
of the RCAF considered necessary 
to meet minimum requirements for 
National Defence.”29
The paper, prepared by Squadron 
Leader G.V. Walsh,30 considered 
three contingencies for which the 
service must plan: direct or home 
defence (coastal), the maintenance 
of neutrality, and provision for an 
expeditionary force. Of these, coastal 
defence was the most vital, and it 
was on this major concern that most 
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planning throughout the remainder 
of the 1930s concentrated. Coastal 
defence included, Walsh noted, 
“protection of important localities 
and ports from air raids, defence 
of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts 
by means of coast reconnaissance, 
anti-submarine patrols, co-operation 
with coast defence artillery, and 
protection of empire Air Routes 
and Convoys.”31 Seven Permanent 
Force squadrons were required to 
carry out the tasks, four of them 
controlled by Group Headquarters 
at Halifax and Vancouver, each with 
one bomber and one flying-boat 
squadron. The others were one army 
cooperation squadron which would 
maintain contact with the latest 
doctrine and equipment in the United 
Kingdom and provide a training 
cadre for Non-Permanent army 
cooperation squadrons required on 
mobilization; one fighter squadron 
with a secondary bombing capability; 
and one general purpose squadron 
convertible either to bombers or 
fighters. The army cooperation 
squadron would be stationed at 
Ottawa where it could work closely 
with the militia, the fighter squadron 
in Montreal where it would be 
available to reinforce Atlantic coast 
defences, and the general purpose 
squadron at Winnipeg able to 
reinforce Pacific defences. Two other 
Group Headquarters, at Winnipeg 
and Montreal, as well as sufficient 
supply depots and administrative 
services for an expanded force, 
completed the  command and 
logistics structure. In addition, 12 
Non-Permanent squadrons, four 
each of fighter, bomber, and army 
cooperation aircraft, formed in the 
principal Canadian cities, would 
provide further operational air 
support on mobilization.32
Walsh’s numbers were revised 
as his plan percolated upwards in 
headquarters, but not fundamentally.33 
Nor were his premises challenged. 
The primary consideration for the 
RCAF remained Canadian direct 
defence, the requirements for which 
were the same for either contingency 
of countering enemy raids or for 
maintaining the integrity of the coasts 
to ensure Canadian neutrality. The 
task required forces in being and 
therefore home defence squadrons 
had to be found from the permanent 
force. As McNaughton viewed the 
potential threat:
The outbreak of hostilities, under 
present conditions, would today, 
possibly, and tomorrow probably, be 
signalized by an immediate attack by 
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The minister of National Defence, Grote Stirling, prepares for a flight in an Armstrong Whitworth Atlas. 
9
: Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
66
air. Indeed, such an attack might be 
made before a formal declaration of 
war had been made. It is conceivable 
that attempted air attack from an 
aircraft carrier might not be kept 
secret, but direct attack (by trans-
oceanic flight) could easily be kept 
secret as the destination of aircraft 
cannot be gauged as can that of naval 
or Military Forces. Therefore, there 
would not be time for any Canadian 
Air Forces to expand in sufficient 
time to meet an attack.34
The secondary needs of an 
expeditionary force, which would 
require a preparatory mobilization 
period, would be met by non-
permanent units.
The changing face of war, as 
noted by McNaughton, in which air 
power was assuming much greater 
significance, became a public matter 
in Canada and the United States 
in the spring of 1935. The occasion 
was a leak to the press on closed 
hearings held in February by the 
House of Representatives Committee 
on Military Affairs.35 The Committee 
had heard testimony on legislation 
to extend the existing network of 
military airfields in the United States. 
Several Air Corps officers sketched 
scenarios indicating that the country 
conceivably could be subjected to air 
attack within a relatively short time. 
One pointed out to the Committee 
that the Douglas Company was 
building a bomber able to carry a 
2,500-pound bomb load for 3,000 
miles at a speed of 225 mph. A hostile 
coalition of powers, he thought, 
would be able to establish temporary 
seaborne logistical bases on the North 
American continent to supply a fleet 
of long-range bombers in an attack 
on the continental United States. 
“Fortunately or unfortunately,” he 
informed the startled Representatives, 
“the Creator has given countless 
operating bases within a radius of 
action of this country in the vast 
number of sheltered water areas that 
are available deep in Canada and far 
removed from any sphere of action 
of ground forces.” From James Bay, 
Labrador, and Newfoundland, down 
to Bermuda and the Caribbean, small 
vessels carrying 2,000 tons of supplies 
could establish “floating railheads 
[which] can furnish all the gasoline, 
all the bombs, oil, and ammunition, 
spare parts, all the food that is 
essential to take care of the operating 
personnel of 15 bombers, as well as 
the ground personnel for 30 missions, 
each one of which goes in 1,500 miles 
and comes back 1,500 miles.” With a 
3,000-mile range, a European force 
could fly to Churchill on Hudson 
Bay, for example, timed to meet its 
floating railhead. After refuelling 
and arming up, they then could be 
directed to pre-designated targets. 
Unlike ground troops, their flexibility 
precluded the need to concentrate 
anywhere but in the target area: 
“With the radius of action that we 
have, they could move from points 
in James Bay and along the Labrador 
coast simultaneously and concentrate 
over any place on the frontiers of this 
vital area and deliver an attack in 
mass against whatever targets you 
want.” The only way to counter such 
a potential threat, he concluded, was 
by bombing the hostile bases. In order 
to create this defensive capability, it 
was necessary to locate and construct 
more airfields, specifically a system in 
A Blackburn Shark, with floats and folded wings, sits on the shore at RCAF Station Jerico Beach. The RCAF modified most aircraft 
it obtained for use on rivers and lakes.  
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each of the threatened regions of the 
country with sufficient intermediate 
stations to connect them.36 Canada’s 
position was particularly strategic, 
another officer emphasized. Even 
if Canada itself was not actively 
hostile, its neutrality would cause 
problems because “neutral i ty 
involves responsibilities as well as 
rights, and flying across Canadian 
territory would be a violation of 
Canadian neutrality, and if they did 
not take steps to carry out the laws of 
neutrality we would have to do so, I 
imagine.“37
Official reaction in Washington 
to the leaked testimony was swift 
and vehement. President Roosevelt, 
his Secretary of State for War, and 
the State Department immediately 
repudiated the suggestion that the 
United States viewed Canada in 
anyway other than the best of “good 
neighbours” or that any resort to 
arms was conceivable. The officers 
who testified, they made clear, did 
not set United States’ policy and in 
no way represented it; moreover, 
the Committee was irresponsible 
in making their private views 
public. Apologies abounded, but the 
legislation itself passed the House 
in June and the Senate a month 
later, both unopposed, and received 
Presidential approval in August. (The 
first site selected was at Fairbanks, 
Alaska, in July 1936).38
Canadian reaction was generally 
restrained. The Department of 
External Affairs obtained a copy of 
the hearings and asked the General 
Staff for comment. Their report was 
remarkably sympathetic with the 
American military viewpoint. They 
accepted the need to plan for all 
contingencies, however unpalatable, 
and thought “The United States is, in 
consequence, obliged to contemplate 
measures to protect itself from attack 
not by Canada but via Canada.” The 
staff agreed that the combination of 
advancing technology and Canada’s 
large and uninhabited coastline 
posed potential difficulties for 
American planners but “there is no 
record of their having uttered one 
syllable of hostility towards Canada.” 
Therefore,
No umbrage can properly be taken 
by Canada at these disclosures. 
Publicity has simply been given to 
the fact that is known to the world 
of Canada’s impotence with regard 
to anti-aircraft defence. Not only are 
our gates wide open but we have not 
even the semblance of a fence and 
our neighbour is, in consequence, 
obliged to provide against our lack 
of provision.39
Other  Canadian  comment 
agreed. The Ottawa Evening Citizen 
editorialized that the United States 
had to look to its own defence, and 
if Canada was not doing its share, 
it was because the Government 
had “virtually disbanded the Royal 
Canadian Air Force.” Canada could 
afford to ignore its responsibilities 
no longer “unless the pretence of 
nationhood is to be completely 
abandoned.”40
T h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  b y  t h e 
Air Defences Bill officially were 
acknowledged and extended that 
fall in a staff study approved by 
McNaughton’s successor, Major-
General E.C. Ashton. Although the 
United States legitimately could be 
concerned with a bombing threat, the 
planners noted, “As the Eastern and 
Western portions of Canada lie on 
the Great Circle routes from Europe 
and Eastern Asia to the United States, 
respectively, it is clear that Canada is 
still more exposed to air operations 
from overseas…[consequently] the 
continued supposition that Canada 
is and will remain free from attack 
by a trans-oceanic power is becoming 
open to criticism.” The paper, which 
was primarily concerned with 
devising mechanisms to mobilize 
the full resources of the country in the 
event of war, emphasized that “the 
question of air defence is becoming 
one of increasing importance to this 
country.“41
Despite McNaughton’s and 
Ashton’s  advocacy,  however , 
RCAF expansion proceeded only 
imperceptibly. A battle of memoranda 
ensued as the militia and air force 
skirmished with the navy before 
the Treasury Board for a share of 
diminishing funds sufficient to enable 
them to survive. The depression and 
financial retrenchment continued 
to win. Estimates through 1935 
remained below the already stringent 
1931 level and the air force neither 
could maintain the manpower levels 
established for the disarmament 
proposals  nor obtain suitable 
aircraft.42 The only military machines 
available in 1930 were the aging Siskin 
fighters and Atlas army cooperation 
machines bought earlier. The total 
number of aircraft on hand in that 
year was 235. Between 1930 and 1935, 
143 machines were written off due to 
age, crashes, or general deterioration, 
and only 82 replacements were made, 
leaving a balance in October 1935 
of 174. These included 8 Siskins, 15 
Atlas’, 5 converted Vancouver flying-
boats, and 4 Shark torpedo bombers 
for operational use in addition to 40 
training and 45 civil types. It was 
not much from which to fashion a 
fighting force capable of protecting 
the nation’s shores.43
A change  in  the  pol i t i ca l 
climate had to precede any material 
improvement, and this did not 
begin until late in 1935 when the 
depression-plagued administration of 
R.B. Bennett gave way to Mackenzie 
King’s Liberals. King’s resumption 
of power could hardly have been 
received optimistically by those 
pressing for a larger defence budget. 
The Prime Minister always had been 
somewhat suspicious of the military. 
For sound political reasons King had 
to be extremely wary of Britain’s 
claims to leadership and solidarity, 
as imperial military ties could 
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easily involve Canada in foreign 
entanglements. The services were not 
equally suspect, however. The Navy 
was hopelessly anglophile, and the 
army, despite its protestations to the 
contrary, always kept the notion of an 
imperial expeditionary force well in 
mind; but the air force was different. 
In his earlier administrations, in 
the 1920s, Mackenzie King had 
looked favourably on the new service 
because its active role in the economic 
development of the frontier provided 
obvious political advantages which 
a purely military air force could 
not. Now, in a different context, 
the RCAF was placed once more in 
most favoured status because of its 
unsullied role in home defence.44
* * * * *
All this took time. It was not until the following August 
that King briefed himself on the 
appalling inadequacies of the 
three services. His diary records in 
stunning detail the tortuous process 
he underwent persuading first 
himself, then his Cabinet colleagues, 
and then the Liberal caucus that the 
potentially disastrous combination 
of accelerating international anarchy 
and the complete absence of national 
defences had to be faced. He was 
partially successful. The inherent 
nature of the problem meant that 
there could be no quick solution, 
but from the 1937-1938 fiscal year, 
estimates began to rise helpfully. 
Throughout the parliamentary 
discussion, the government made 
clear that priority was to be given 
direct, national defence with the 
RCAF manning the first line.45
Accordingly, the RCAF prepared 
plans to implement expansion on 
three-, five-, and ten-year programs. 
An RCAF Fairchild 71 is moored to the dock at RCAF Station Rockcliffe in October 1930. In front of the aircraft are (left to right): C.S. 
MacDonald, Flight Sergeant H.J. Winny, Flight Lieutenant F.J. Mawdesley and Sergeant S.C. Dearaway. 
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The estimated cost of the three-
year scheme was about $31 million 
in the first year, $17 million in the 
second, and $11 million in the third. 
As well as for operational units 
the estimates included funds for 
larger training facilities, additional 
instructors, housing, and ancillary 
equipment. In comparison, the five-
year program called for a first-year 
expenditure of about $19 million 
with the subsequent years scaled 
proportionately. Ultimately the RCAF 
cut its own first-year figures to $16 
million and finally received only two-
thirds of it. The funding, of course, 
went only part way in equipping 
the air force, but it is arguable that 
the existing industrial base could 
not absorb much more in the early 
stages.46 Modern aircraft were vitally 
needed, but most countries were 
rearming by this time and there were 
not enough to go around. In any case, 
a sound logistical foundation had to 
be laid. As one staff memorandum 
pointed out, accumulating stocks was 
a long, drawn-out process:
There is a large and varied list of 
equipment which represents a 
considerable capital investment 
required before the aircraft can be 
maintained and operated efficiently. 
These include, aircraft spares; rations; 
clothing and necessities; motor 
transport; motor transport gasoline 
and oil; marine craft; miscellaneous 
states including hand tools; work 
shop equipment; electrical equipment; 
parachutes; armament stores; bombs 
and ammunition; barrack stores; 
wireless telegraphy equipment; 
photographic equipment; aerial 
gasoline and oil; overhaul equipment 
(engines and aeroplanes); printing 
and stationery, etc.47
War overtook rearmament in 
1939. In late August the RCAF’s few 
ill-equipped, operational squadrons 
deployed to their war stations on 
either coast and began flying coastal 
patrols almost immediately. It was 
not an air force to strike immediate 
terror in the hearts of the enemy, 
but fortunately the state of the art 
precluded trans-Atlantic bombing. 
It had just over 3,000 all ranks in 
uniform, 11 permanent and another 
12 non-permanent formed but 
ill-equipped squadrons, and an 
assortment of obsolescent military 
aircraft – Stranraers, Vancouvers, 
Sharks, Battles and Wapitis, along 
with a few Hurricanes.  These 
numbers represented less than half 
the men and a quarter of the fighting 
aircraft the RCAF needed to perform 
its primary function of defending 
Canada’s coasts. There was nothing 
left for other tasks. “Canada has 
neither equipment nor trained 
personnel in effective quantities 
to offer the Royal Air Force at the 
present time,” the Chief of the Air 
Staff wrote in 1939. Therefore “we 
can best help the United Kingdom by 
concentrating our entire efforts, after 
securing our home defence, upon the 
production of the greatest possible 
numbers of trained personnel in all 
categories.”48
Measured against a standard of 
effective national air defence, the 
RCAF in 1939 clearly fell far short. 
Measured against what it was able 
to achieve over the next few years, 
however, the RCAF had laid well 
the basis for future success. Within a 
relatively few years it had reoriented 
itself from an exclusively civil to 
a military service. In the process, 
the RCAF’s defence responsibilities 
had grown sufficiently to ensure its 
service maturation from subordinate 
status to complete independence. It 
had, in fact, assumed the primary 
responsibility from the navy and 
militia for Canada’s direct home 
defence. By 1938 the RCAF had 
in place a separate command and 
administrative air defence structure 
spanning Canada, and its senior 
officer had been granted co-equal 
s tatus with the other  service 
commanders as chief of the air 
staff. Importantly, it also had on 
hand a cadre of technically trained 
staff officers prepared to take over 
the myriad of higher appointments 
an inflated war establishment 
created. It was, consequently, able 
to mobilize the country’s aerial 
potential for war, conduct training 
on the unprecedented scale of the 
British Commonwealth Air Training 
Plan, assume responsibility for anti-
submarine and convoy protection 
patrols, and contribute operational 
squadrons to virtually all active 
theatres of war.
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